In the present study, we tested whether subliminal abrupt-onset cues capture attention in a bottom-up or top-down controlled manner. For our tests, we varied the searched-for target-contrast polarity (i.e., dark or light targets against a gray background) over four experiments. In line with the bottom-up hypothesis, our results indicate that subliminal-onset cues capture attention independently of the searched-for target-contrast polarity (Experiment 1), and this effect is not stronger for targets that matched the searched-for target-contrast polarity (Experiment 2). In fact, even to-be-ignored cues associated with a no-go response captured attention in a salience-driven way (Experiment 3). For supraliminal cues, we found attentional capture only by cues with a matching contrast polarity, reflecting contingent capture (Experiment 4). The results point toward a specific role of subliminal abrupt onsets for attentional capture.
At each instance in time, humans only select a small amount of visual information available in their surroundings. By selective visual attention, some information in the visual field is prioritized, while other information is ignored (Egeth & Yantis, 1997) . For example, since Helmholtz's times, we know that humans can attend to one location in space and disregard other locations. This ability is known as orienting (Posner, 1980) . Selective visual attention in general and orienting in particular operate at both conscious (or aware) and unconscious (or unaware) levels (Neisser, 1967) . Even if participants are not aware of a visual stimulus, they might orient spatial attention toward this stimulus. This has been called unconscious orienting (McCormick, 1997) .
There is an ongoing debate as to whether unconscious or subliminal stimuli attract attention in a purely exogenous and automatic way or in a top-down contingent or conditionally automatic manner. According to Posner and Snyder (1975) , purely automatic processes need to fulfill three criteria. The process should not draw on limited cognitive resources, and should not depend on prior intentions. It should be resistant against intentions to avoid the process, should be consciousness-independent, and could operate outside of awareness. On the other hand, authors like Neumann (1990) and Bargh (1989) emphasized, with their concept of direct parameter specification, or conditional automaticity respectively, that unconscious processing frequently (if not always) depends on prior intentions. In psychological experiments, humans set up their top-down control settings to comply with the task instructions. After the setup of such control settings, the corresponding processes can be triggered in a seemingly automatic fashion, even by stimuli that remain outside of awareness (e.g., Ansorge & Neumann, 2005) .
The same opposing views that were held with respect to psychological processes in general have recently been discussed with respect to attention, with one party claiming that unconscious orienting (as defined above) is purely automatic, exogenous, or stimulus-driven and does not require a fitting intention (McCormick, 1997; Mulckhuyse, Talsma, & Theeuwes, 2007; Zhaoping, 2008 ; for a recent review, see Mulckhuyse & Theeuwes, 2010) , whereas other scholars argue that unconscious orienting is a form of top-down, contingent attentional capture (e.g., Ansorge, Horstmann, & Worschech, 2010; Held, Ansorge, & Muller, 2010) . The concept of top-down contingent capture had been originally developed to explain conscious orienting (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992) . Recently, however, top-down contingent capture has been extended to unconscious orienting, where researchers believe that unconscious orienting also depends on a fit between stimulus features and intentions, here, in particular, the target-search templates (Ansorge, Horstmann, & Worschech, 2010; Held et al., 2010; Kanai, Tsuchiya, & Verstraten, 2006 ; for a recent review, see Ansorge, Horstmann, & Scharlau, 2011) .
In this context, exogenous, or automatic orienting, denotes the attraction of attention by stimulus features, regardless of the topdown settings and the goals of the participants. The major principle that has been identified to be responsible for stimulus-driven attention is salience, or singleton capture. One very prominent model that implemented this form of attentional capture is the salience model (Itti & Koch, 2001; Itti, Koch, & Niebur, 1998; Parkhurst, Law, & Niebur, 2002) . Salience is calculated as a summed local feature contrast of color, intensity and orientation. For example, a feature singleton, that is, one stimulus standing out by one unique feature (e.g., a red apple) among stimuli which are more similar or homogeneous to one another with respect to the same feature (e.g., green apples) would be of high salience. According to the salience model, a highly salient stimulus is likely to attract attention automatically (Fuchs, Ansorge, Redies, & Leder, 2011; Itti et al., 1998) . Thus the model also explains why singletons could capture attention in an exogenous manner. This has been demonstrated in several studies in which irrelevant featuresingleton distractors presented away from a searched-for relevant target stimulus captured attention and interfered with searching for the targets (Theeuwes, 1991 (Theeuwes, , 1992 (Theeuwes, , 2010 .
Abrupt-onset singletons seem to capture attention in an exogenous way, as well (Breitmeyer & Ganz, 1976) . Support for this conclusion comes from the so-called "cueing paradigm" (Jonides, 1981) . In this task, in each trial participants are presented with a task-relevant visual target at one of several possible positions. Of note, participants do not know at which position the target will appear. In this situation, presenting a peripheral abrupt-onset singleton as a cue with a short stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) of about less than 200 -300 ms before the target and at one of the possible target positions, the cue facilitates finding the target if it is presented at the same position (SP) as the target. This facilitation can be observed relative to a condition with the cue at a different position (DP) than the target, a finding that has been attributed to the capture of attention by the cue (Jonides, 1981) .
In line with the assumption that orienting toward abrupt-onset singleton cues is exogenous, the cueing effect of the abrupt-onset cue (a) can be observed with very short cue-target intervals, meaning that the processing of the cue is indeed not very demanding (Müller & Rabbitt, 1989) , (b) does not depend on the informativeness of the cue for the likely target position, and (c) can even be demonstrated where participants are asked to ignore an uninformative onset-singleton cue (Remington, Johnston, & Yantis, 1992) , or have to search for a different feature (e.g., color, Theeuwes, 1994; Schreij, Owens, & Theeuwes, 2008) . Most importantly in the context of the present study, researchers have demonstrated the third criterion of automatic processing according to Posner and Snyder (1975) , the awareness-independence of the cueing effect of the abrupt-onset singletons. That is, using barely seen low-contrast cues (Ivanoff & Klein, 2003; McCormick, 1997) , or onset cues that were made invisible by low contrasts and very short temporal lead times of less than about 16 ms (as compared with subsequent onsets; Mulckhuyse et al., 2007) , at least two studies seemed to confirm that exogenous orienting toward the abrupt-onset cues also does not depend on awareness.
Other researchers, however, demonstrated that unconscious orienting is conditional (or contingent) on top-down control settings-in the current study-a match of the unconscious cue to the participants' top-down control settings for the targets (or the target-search templates; Ansorge et al., 2010; Ansorge et al., 2009; Held et al., 2010) . For example, participants of Ansorge et al. (2010) searched for red targets. Before the targets, a backward-masked and therefore invisible cue was used for unconsciously orienting the participants toward one of the target positions. In these experiments, unconscious orienting (an SP-DP performance difference) was found with top-down matching red cues, but not, for example, with green cues, although both of these cues were color singletons. The results were explained by top-down, contingent unconscious orienting. In this case, the red cues matched the attentional control settings (or target templates) that the participants must have used to search for the relevant red targets (Folk & Remington, 1998; Folk et al., 1992) . In fact, when Ansorge and colleagues (2010) compared unconscious orienting effects by topdown matching nonsingleton color cues (e.g., one red cue among one green, one gray, and one blue distractor) and by top-down matching singleton color cues (e.g., one red cue among three blue distractors), the orienting or cueing effects were of similar size. Because the nonsingleton cue's effect reflected top-down contingent capture, this means that exogenous capture by a singleton cue did not even increase the unconscious orienting effects of the cues and that therefore the full cueing effect must have been due to top-down contingent capture, in this case, on the basis of a fit of the cue's color to the top-down control settings.
Against this background of conflicting interpretations, in the current study we tested whether unconscious orienting toward abrupt-onset cues is indeed a salience-based exogenous form of capture (Theeuwes, 1991 (Theeuwes, , 1994 Yantis & Jonides, 1990) or whether it critically depended on a match between the specific features of the unconscious cues and the top-down control settings of the participants (Folk et al., 1992) . To test this, we adapted the procedures of Mulckhuyse et al. (2007) , but we used both darker and lighter cues and targets relative to the background. We independently varied the sign of the polarity of the cue's contrast from that of the searched-for target (i.e., in each trial, cue and target could either have the same or the opposite contrast polarity). If the salience account holds, feature differences (in the current study, luminance differences) rather than the specific feature identities should account for the capture of attention. Thus, a cue should capture attention regardless of the polarity of its contrast, even if all searched-for targets consist of only one type of contrast polarity. In the past, this has been shown with clearly visible, abruptonset luminance contrasts of similar strength, but of opposite polarities. These had equal potential to capture attention in a temporal-order judgment task (Steinman, Steinman, & Lehmkuhle, 1997) . Therefore, if the unconscious onset cues attract attention automatically, or exogenously, on the basis of their salience, we expect that it should not matter which kind of targetcontrast polarity participants actually search for. Regardless of whether participants search for a dark or a light target, an unconscious dark or light cue should capture attention.
If contingent capture based on specific searched-for target-contrast polarities is responsible for unconscious orienting, only those cues with contrast polarity matching participants' search templates should capture attention. Unconscious dark cues should capture attention if participants search for dark targets, but not if they search for light targets, and unconscious light cues should capture attention if the participants search for light targets, but not if they search for dark targets. Note that, in contrast to varying the relevance of the cues (e.g., Ivanoff & Klein, 2003) , no direct manipulation of the control settings was applied in this study. We set out to investigate contingent involuntary control as labeled by Folk and colleagues (1992) . Specifically, in this study we explored contingent capture for contrast polarity. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
General Method: Overview
In our four experiments, participants were instructed to search for a predefined target-contrast polarity (i.e., for light or dark disks). In 80% of the trials (or 40% in Experiment 3), a target was equally likely to be shown on the left or the right of fixation (i.e., screen center). In each trial, an abrupt-onset cue was presented. The cue was a ring on the left or on the right. This cue had a head start of one frame, as compared with two additional placeholder rings in the center and on the opposite side of the screen (for the procedures, see Figure 1 ). Therefore, the cue was an abrupt-onset singleton. Also, due to the brief interval between the cue and the placeholders, the participants should remain unaware of the cuethat is, cueing should be unconscious and the cue (here, the head start of one stimulus) should not be seen by the participants (Mulckhuyse et al., 2007) . In Experiment 4, cues were rendered visible by omitting the two placeholder rings in an additional supraliminal condition. (Objective cue visibility was tested in separate blocks at the end of the experiments.)
The cue was uninformative with respect to the target position: If a target was shown, the cue preceded the target disk equally likely at the SP as the target or at a DP than the target. Two cue-target intervals were used. In the short interval, the cue-target SOA was 16 ms. Here, the target disk was presented together with the placeholder rings. In the short interval, facilitation in SP as compared with DP conditions was expected. In the long interval, the cue-target SOA was 1,016 ms. Here, the target was shown 1000 ms after the onset of the placeholder disks. In the long interval, inhibition for SP as compared with DP conditions was expected (Mulckhuyse et al., 2007) . This reallocation of attention and subsequent reluctance of a return of attention back to a previously cued and attended location is called inhibition of return (IOR; Klein, 2000; Posner, 1980; Posner & Cohen, 1984) , and is typically observed with cue-target intervals of more than 300 ms (Taylor & Klein, 1998) .
Most important for our hypotheses, the cue was either of the same contrast polarity as the target or it had a different contrast polarity than the target. Across our four experiments, we varied the searched-for target-contrast polarity to clarify whether unconscious orienting is exogenous or top-down contingent. Using a mixed design, in Experiment 1, we varied the searched-for targetcontrast polarity (light vs. dark) between two groups of participants and used both kinds of cues (same and opposite polarity) for all of our participants. In Experiment 2, we investigated whether cueing effects of opposite polarity cues increased when participants searched for both (light and dark) contrast polarities at the same time. From Experiment 1 to Experiment 2, an increment of the cueing effect should be found if the cueing effect would depend on top-down control settings. To anticipate our results of the first two experiments, in line with the salience explanation and at variance with an explanation based on top-down contingent capture for searched-for contrast polarities, cues of opposite contrast polarity as the target elicited the same unconscious orienting effects as cues with the same contrast polarity as the target. Therefore, we finally tested whether this salience-driven cueing effect is also resistant to avoidance. To that end, we used go and no-go contrast polarities in Experiment 3. Half of the participants had to respond to dark targets and ignored light no-go targets, whereas this mapping was reversed for the other half of the participants. As a consequence, similar-polarity cues matched the searched-for contrast, whereas opposite-polarity cues resembled the to-be-ignored no-go feature. We hypothesized that a purely automatic capture effect of the opposite-polarity cues should be resistant to avoidance and should lead to a cueing effect, although the opposite-contrast polarity was associated with a no-go feature. Again, consistent with our findings in Experiments 1 and 2, the cueing effect was purely automatic, resistant to avoidance, and found not to depend on a top-down set. In the final Experiment (4), we tested whether participants could set up a search set for contrast polarity at all. For our tests, in addition to the subliminal condition, a supraliminal condition was tested. The results show a qualitative difference between visible and invisible cues: Wheras in the supraliminal condition we found top-down contingent capture dependent on contrast polarity, in the subliminal condition we found exogenous capture that was independent of contrast polarity. The results also indicate that the cue in the prior Experiments 1 through 3 indeed remained outside awareness. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Experiment 1 Method
Participants. Sixteen participants (11 women; mean age 26.1 years, range 20 -32), mostly students, participated on a voluntary basis for course credit. Participants in all our experiments had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The procedure was explained prior to data acquisition, and informed consent was obtained from each participant.
Apparatus. Stimuli were presented on a 19-inch screen with a resolution of 1,024 ϫ 768 pixels and a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Stimulus presentation was controlled using Experiment Builder software (SR Research, Kanata, ON, Canada). Participants were seated at a distance of 64 cm in front of the monitor and head position was stabilized using chinrests.
Stimuli and procedure. Figure 1 shows the procedure, adapted from Mulckhuyse et al. (2007) . The abrupt-onset cue was a 3.0°-diameter ring of 0.25°width. The cue was presented for 16 ms to the left or right of fixation with an eccentricity of 6.7°before two additional placeholder rings, one at fixation and the other on the opposite side, were presented. In the short SOA, the target (a 1.9°-diameter disk centered inside the left or right ring) appeared along with the placeholders, whereas in the long SOA, the target was presented with a delay of 1000 ms.
Targets and cues were either dark (23 cd/m 2 ) or light (122 cd/m 2 ) against a gray background (72.5 cd/m 2 ), and equated for their stimulus-background Weber contrasts. A target was shown in 80% of the trials, and a cue with the same or the opposite contrast polarity (with luminance values the same as for the respective target contrasts) equally likely preceded the target at two different cue-target intervals (SOAs: 16 and 1,016 ms). In 20% of the trials, no target was presented. Different conditions were presented in a randomized sequence. left off here.
Participants had two tasks in separate blocks. In the first task (the unconscious cueing task), they had to quickly and accurately detect the targets, and press the space bar on the computer keyboard if a target was shown, or refrain from pressing the space bar if no target was shown. Half of the participants were presented with dark targets and had to search for these dark targets, and half were presented with light targets and had to search for these light targets.
The second blocked task concerned cue awareness. Cue awareness was assessed with the same participants and in a separate block after the cueing task. Here, participants had to report at which of two positions the cue was presented. They had to press a left-hand button with the left index finger if the cue was on the left, and a right-hand button with the right index finger if the cue was on the right. During the unconscious cueing task, stimuli were presented in five blocks consisting of 40 trials each (200 trials in total, 20% catch trials). The cue-report task was conducted in four blocks consisting of 20 trials each (80 trials in total), immediately following the unconscious cueing task.
Results
Awareness of subliminal cues. Cue awareness was assessed for the same participants in a separate block after the unconscious cueing task. It was calculated as an accuracy in localizing the cues (as a percentage-that is, a number of correct responses divided by the total number of trials times 100). In Experiment 1, a onesample t test (against 50%) revealed an above-chance accuracy, t(15) ϭ 4.2, p Ͻ .01, M ϭ 62.1%. For the analysis of RTs (see sections below), participants were therefore divided according to their cue awareness into two subgroups via median split of cuediscrimination performance (Held et al., 2010, Experiment 5) , one group showing better-than-chance-level performance (high-aware participants), and the other showing chance-level performance (low-aware participants).
Unconscious cueing task. Participants generally performed very well on this task, reflected in only a small number of misses and false alarms (mean error rate was 1.9% in target-present trials and 3.8% in the catch trials). The error rates were too low for proper statistical analysis. For the analysis of the RTs, trials with incorrect responses as well as outliers (RTs deviating more than two standard deviations from their respective correct mean, here, 3.3%) were excluded.
Low-aware participants. As explained, participants showed different levels of cue awareness. Therefore, our test of unconscious orienting was based on only the low-aware participants. The participants in this analysis performed at chance level when localizing the cue in the second block (N ϭ 8, mean percent correct ϭ 53.1%, one-sample t test against 50%, t(7) ϭ 2.1, p ϭ .08).
The results of a repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean correct RTs with the variables cue position relative to the target (SP vs. DP), contrast polarity of the cue relative to that of the target (same polarity vs. opposite polarity), and SOA (short vs. long) can be found in Appendix A (see Table 1 ). The crucial interaction between cue position and SOA was significant. The following analysis therefore focuses on results of the short SOA only. In the long SOA we found no significant effects at all, indicating a lack of IOR. (For further details see Table 3 of Appendix A).
A repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean correct RTs with the variables cue position (SP vs. DP) and contrast polarity (same polarity vs. opposite polarity) of the short SOA led to a significant main effect for cue position, F(1, 7) ϭ 93.2, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .93. This effect indicates orienting toward the cue with faster responses for SP cues (RT ϭ 329 ms) than DP cues (RT ϭ 360 ms). Both the main effect for contrast polarity as well as its interaction with cue position failed to reach significance (both Fs Ͻ 2.9, both ps Ͼ .13). The lack of an interaction between the two variables strengthens the exogenous view of unconscious orienting, since cues captured attention independently of their match to the searched-for target contrast.
High-aware participants. Participants in the second half were aware of the cue, as indicated by a significant above-chance performance in localizing the cue in the second block (N ϭ 8, mean percent correct ϭ 70.0%, one-sample t test against 50%: t(7) ϭ 4.8, p Ͻ .01).
The full results of a repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean RTs with the variables cue position (SP vs. DP), contrast polarity (same vs. opposite), and SOA (short vs. long) can be found in Appendix A (see Table 2 ). Here we found a crucial significant three-way interaction between the variables, F(1, 7) ϭ 6.6, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .49. Again, the following section focuses on the analysis of the short SOA only and the results of the long SOA are displayed in Table 4 (see Appendix A). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
A repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean RTs with the variables cue position (SP vs. DP) and contrast polarity (same vs. opposite) of the short SOA led to the following results. Again, we also found capture. This was reflected by a significant main effect for cue position, F(1, 7) ϭ 53.9, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .89, indicating facilitation for SP (RT ϭ 348 ms) compared with DP conditions (RT ϭ 378 ms). Furthermore, we found a significant effect of contrast polarity, with generally faster responses to oppositepolarity cues (RT ϭ 357 ms) than to same-polarity cues (RT ϭ 369 ms). The significant interaction between both variables, F(1, 7) ϭ 7.4, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .51, and follow-up Bonferroniadjusted t tests revealed that the high-aware participants only showed the cueing effect for cues with the same contrast polarity as the target (SP: RT ϭ 346 ms, DP: RT ϭ 393 ms; p Ͻ .001), but with the opposite contrast polarity as the target, there was only a tendency (SP: RT ϭ 351 ms, DP: RT ϭ 364 ms; p ϭ .09). This interaction also revealed that the interference of cues at different positions than the target (DP) was stronger for same-polarity cues (RT ϭ 393 ms) than for opposite-polarity cues (RT ϭ 364 ms; p Ͻ .001). This means that a cue with the same contrast polarity as the searched-for target might have captured more attention than a cue with the opposite contrast polarity as the searched-for target, because in the SP condition, no difference was found between same-polarity and opposite-polarity cues (p ϭ .60). This may explain why the net cueing effect (DP RT Ϫ SP RT) was larger for same-polarity cues than opposite-polarity cues.
Awareness of the cues and its correlation with orienting. To additionally test whether cue awareness accounted for orienting (see also the complementary analysis above), we correlated individual percentage values of correct cue detection with their corresponding cueing-effects (DP-SP differences). This was done separately for the same and opposite contrast polarities in the short SOA. The rationale of this analysis was the following: If cue awareness accounted for cueing effects, we expected a significant positive correlation. In contrast to this reasoning, we found no correlation between orienting effects and their respective cue awareness (percentage values) for both contrast polarities (same polarity: p ϭ .67, statistical power of the correlation 1Ϫ␤ ϭ .70; opposite polarity: p ϭ .41, 1Ϫ␤ ϭ .56).
Discussion
In Experiment 1 we tested whether orienting toward unconscious abrupt-onset cues is in fact exogenous. In line with this possibility, we found facilitation-that is, shorter RTs in the SP than DP conditions for short SOAs with both same and opposite contrast-polarity cues in low-aware participants. This finding suggests that attention was indeed captured in an exogenous manner, because according to the salience view, both contrast polarities should have an equal potential to trigger orienting. However, since we found no significant cueing effect for the short SOA for high-aware participants when an opposite contrast-polarity cue was presented, we cannot safely rule out some contribution of top-down contingent capture based on contrast polarity to our results. Furthermore, as can be seen in Figure 2b , cueing effects were stronger with same-polarity cues than with opposite-polarity cues. To address this question and confirm our findings in a slightly different setup, we conducted Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, all participants were instructed to search for and respond to both dark and light targets at the same time. Also, Figure 2 . Results of the short SOA of Experiment 1. (a) Depicted are the mean correct reaction times (RTs) and standard errors (bars) for the short SOA. Results are plotted for cue position (SP and DP), for cue-contrast polarity (same contrast polarity and opposite contrast polarity as the target), and for cue awareness (high-aware and low-aware participants). (b) Depicted are the respective net-cueing effects (mean RTs for DP minus mean RTs for SP conditions) of the short SOA. The left two bars show the effects for the high-aware; the right two bars show the low-aware participants. Cueing effects of cues sharing the same contrast polarity as the target are plotted in black; results for cues with the opposite polarity than the target are plotted in white. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
dark and light targets were presented in a pseudorandom sequence. Therefore, the participants had to search for both contrast polarities in all of the trials to find the targets. Again, the targets were equally likely preceded by cues of the same or the opposite contrast polarity as the target. In this experiment both cue contrast polarities (same and opposite as the target) matched the participants' actual top-down search sets for target-contrast polarities on all of the trials. However, as before, the contrasts of the cues and targets within a trial were again the same in only half of the trials, and they were different in the other half. Compared with Experiment 1, where opposite contrast-polarity cues did not match the attentional control settings, those cues now would have matched the attentional control settings. Therefore, if contingent capture contributed to unconscious orienting, we would have expected a stronger cueing effect (i.e., SP-DP difference) for the oppositepolarity cues in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. (In contrast, the cueing effect for the same-polarity cues should not increase from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2, because this cue's contrast polarity would have matched the attentional control settings in both Experiments 1 and 2.)
Method
Participants. Sixteen new participants (14 women; mean age 21.7 years, range 20 -26) took part in return for course credit. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli and procedure. The experimental setup and procedures were the same as in Experiment 1 with one crucial exception. For each participant, half of the targets were light and half were dark. The different contrast polarities of the targets were presented in a pseudorandom order. Therefore, the participants had to search for both target-contrast polarities in all of the trials. Thus, both kinds of cues, cues with the same contrast and cues with the opposite contrast as the target would have matched the top-down control settings of the participants. As before, no response was demanded in case no target was presented.
Dark and light targets were presented equally often and in random order within 10 blocks consisting of 40 trials (400 trials in total, 20% catch trials). The cue-report task was conducted in eight blocks consisting of 20 trials each (160 trials in total), directly after the subliminal cueing task, again with the same stimuli and participants.
Results
Awareness of subliminal cues. The percentage analysis of correctly located cues revealed above-chance performance via a one-sample t test against 50%, t(15) ϭ 3.0, p Ͻ .05, M ϭ 59.4%. Participants were therefore again divided into high-aware and low-aware participants via median split for subsequent RT analysis.
Unconscious cueing task. Again, participants performed well and had low error rates (1.4% in target-present trials, and 3.6% in the catch trials). These error trials and RT outliers (3.4%) were excluded from further RT analysis. Results are depicted in Figure 3 .
Low-aware participants. This analysis contains data of lowaware participants that performed on chance level when localizing the cue in the second block, N ϭ 8, mean percent correct ϭ 50.4%, one-sample t test against 50%: t(7) ϭ 0.6, p ϭ .54.
The full results of a repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean RTs with the variables cue position (SP vs. DP), contrast polarity (same vs. opposite), and SOA (short vs. long) can be found in Appendix B (see Table 5 ). Here we found a crucial significant interaction between cue position and SOA F(1, 7) ϭ 32.3, p Ͻ .01, This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. p 2 ϭ .82. The following section focuses on the analysis of the short SOA only and the results of the long SOA are displayed in Table 7 (see Appendix B) .
A repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean correct RTs of the short SOA with the variables cue position (SP vs. DP) and contrast polarity (same vs. opposite) led to the following results. We found a significant main effect for cue position, F(1, 7) ϭ 61.6, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .90, indicating a significant cueing effect (SP: RT ϭ 344 ms, DP: RT ϭ 374 ms). A significant main effect for contrast polarity, F(1, 7) ϭ 25.6, p Ͻ .01, p 2 ϭ .79, showed that responses were generally slower after same-polarity cues (RT ϭ 366 ms) than after opposite-polarity cues (RT ϭ 351 ms). The interaction between the two variables failed to reach significance (p ϭ .29).
High-aware participants. Participants in this analysis were probably aware of the cue as indicated by a significant abovechance performance in localizing the cue in the second block (N ϭ 8, mean percent correct ϭ 68.4%, one-sample t test against 50%: t(7) ϭ 4.2, p Ͻ .01).
The full results of a repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean RTs with the variables cue position (SP vs. DP), contrast polarity (same vs. opposite), and SOA (short vs. long) can be found in Appendix B (see Table 6 ). Here we found a crucial significant three-way interaction between the variables, F(1, 7) ϭ 8.23, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .54. The following section focuses on the analysis of the short SOA and the results of the long SOA are displayed in Table  8 (see Appendix B) .
A repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean correct RTs of the short SOA with the variables cue position (SP vs. DP) and contrast polarity (same vs. opposite), led to basically the same effects as were reported for the low-aware participants. We found a significant main effect for cue position, F(1, 7) ϭ 50.3, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .88, reflecting attentional capture (SP: RT ϭ 361 ms, DP: RT ϭ 384 ms). The main effect for contrast polarity, F(1, 7) ϭ 32.8, p Ͻ .01, p 2 ϭ .82, reflected generally faster responses to oppositepolarity (RT ϭ 364 ms) than to same-polarity cues (RT ϭ 382 ms). The interaction between the two variables failed to reach significance (p ϭ .07).
Awareness of cues and its correlation with orienting. Again, we tested the correlation between cueing effects and cue awareness (percentage values) for both contrast polarities. We found no significant correlation for the same-polarity cues (p ϭ .76, statistical power of the correlation 1Ϫ␤ ϭ .78), and a borderline significant negative correlation for opposite-polarity cues (p ϭ .05, 1Ϫ␤ ϭ .53), indicating decreasing cueing effects with increasing cue awareness.
Additional analysis: Comparison of Experiments 1 and 2. According to the contingent-capture hypothesis, we would have expected a stronger orienting or cueing effect when the cue matched the search set for target-contrast polarities. To test whether contingent capture was involved, we compared results of Experiment 2, in which dark and light cues would have matched the participants' search set, to Experiment 1, in which opposite-contrast-polarity cues did not match the searched-for target-contrast polarity.
For this analysis, we first calculated the individual orienting or cueing effects (i.e., the differences between RTs on DP and SP trials) for the opposite-polarity cues in the short SOAs only. An independent two-sample t test of the corresponding values between experiments failed to reach significance, t(30) ϭ 0.97, p ϭ .34, indicating that there is no significant difference in the amount of orienting elicited by cues that matched the set of target-contrast polarities (Experiment 2) and by cues that did not match the set of target-contrast polarities (Experiment 1). This was also the case when we compared the data of high-aware (p ϭ .86) and lowaware participants (p ϭ .17) of both experiments separately.
Discussion
In Experiment 2 we tested for an additional contribution of top-down contingent capture based on searched-for contrast polarity to the orienting effects. As in Experiment 1, we again found facilitation in the short SOA independently of the participants' level of awareness of the cues and of the cue-target contrast relation (i.e., whether the polarity of the cue was the same as the target or opposite to the target), whereas we failed to confirm a stronger cueing effect for opposite polarity cues when searching for both contrast polarities (Experiment 2), instead of only searching for one target-contrast polarity (Experiment 1). This implies that top-down contingent capture based on contrast-polarityspecific search settings does not contribute to the unconscious orienting effects of the abrupt-onset cues. It seems that unconscious orienting effects of the abrupt-onset cues were of truly exogenous origin. However, we cannot safely exclude the possibility that participants did not adopt any specific top-down set at all in Experiment 2, as all the cues were uninformative for the target location and more than one color had to be searched for (Folk & Anderson, 2010) .
Experiment 3
To put the exogenous orienting hypothesis to yet another test, we conducted a third experiment, in which participants had to actively ignore and refrain from responding to one predefined "no-go" contrast polarity, while at the same time, they had to respond to the other target-contrast polarity.
Between two groups, participants were either instructed to search for dark or light targets, respectively. Yet, in contrast to Experiment 1, we also presented distractors (i.e., disks of the opposite contrast), which participants were asked to ignore and for which they therefore had to refrain from pressing the space bar. For example, participants searching for dark targets were supposed to respond to dark targets but not to light ones. The aim of Experiment 3 was to find out whether the opposite contrastpolarity cues still capture attention in an exogenous and automatic way, even when the task demands the avoidance of responding to the opposite contrast polarity. A cueing effect should be found under these conditions if the orienting effect is truly exogenous and resistant to avoidance (Jonides, 1981) . However, if the effect is due to some form of top-down contingent processing, the effect of the opposite contrast-polarity cue could change if this cue resembles a no-go stimulus. With unconscious words, for example, it has been shown that if the word resembles a no-go stimulus, the unconscious word halts (delays) responding to a go target, even if the word cannot be reported (Van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, & Lamme, 2010) . Likewise, using clearly visible cues Adamo, Pun, Pratt, and Ferber (2008) were able to demonstrate that attentional capture was restricted to cues resembling the go targets and could be successfully avoided altogether if a cue was used that resembled a no-go stimulus. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Method
Participants. Sixteen students (13 women; mean age 20.9 years, range 18 -24) participated for course credit. None of them had participated in the prior two experiments and all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli and procedure. The experimental setup and procedures were the same as in Experiment 2. The crucial difference was that one half of the participants was instructed to respond to dark targets while ignoring the light disks, whereas the other half of the participants searched for light targets while ignoring the dark disks. Trials were the same as in Experiment 2, resulting in 60% catch trials (20% without any disk, 40% with disks of dissimilar contrast polarity to the searched-for contrast of the 400 trials in total).
Results

Awareness of subliminal cues.
A one-sample t test revealed an average above-chance accuracy for all participants in this task, t(15) ϭ 7.6, p Ͻ .001, M ϭ 78.8%. Therefore, participants were again divided into high-aware and low-aware participants for subsequent RT analysis.
Unconscious cueing task. Participants performed well on this task (mean error rates were 1.7% for target-present and 3.2% for target-absent trials). The low error rate did not allow for further statistical analysis. For the RT analysis, the trials with incorrect responses and the RT outliers (3.5%) were excluded. Results are depicted in Figure 4 .
Low-aware participants. Six participants were lowly aware of the cue, as indicated by a chance-level performance when they localized the cue in the second block (N ϭ 6, mean percent correct ϭ 63.2%, one-sample t test against 50%: t(5) ϭ 2.6, p ϭ .05).
The full results of a repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean RTs with the variables cue position (SP vs. DP), contrast polarity (same vs. opposite), and SOA (short vs. long) can be found in Appendix C (see Table 9 ). Here we found a crucial significant interaction between cue position and SOA, F(1, 5) ϭ 47.0, p Ͻ .01, p 2 ϭ .90. The following section focuses on the analysis of the short SOA only, and the results of the long SOA are displayed in Table 11 (see Appendix C).
A repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean correct RTs of the short SOA with the variables cue position (SP vs. DP) and contrast polarity (same vs. opposite) led to the following results. Again, we found evidence for capture in the form of a significant main effect of cue position, F(1, 5) ϭ 42.9, p Ͻ .01, p 2 ϭ .90, with faster responses in SP (RT ϭ 370 ms) than DP conditions (RT ϭ 396 ms). All other effects failed to reach significance (both ps Ͼ .06).
High-aware participants. A majority of the participants were aware of the cue as indicated by a significant above-chance performance in localizing the cue in the second block (N ϭ 10, mean percent correct ϭ 88.1%, one-sample t test against 50%: t(9) ϭ 19.7, p Ͻ .001).
The full results of a repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean RTs with the variables cue position (SP vs. DP), contrast polarity (same vs. opposite), and SOA (short vs. long) can be found in Appendix C (see Table 10 ). Here we found a crucial significant interaction between the variables cue position and SOA, F(1, 9) ϭ 19.1, p Ͻ .01, p 2 ϭ .68. The following section focuses on the analysis of the short SOA, and the results of the long SOA are displayed in Table 12 (see Appendix C).
A repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean correct RTs of the short SOA with the variables cue position (SP vs. DP) and contrast polarity (same vs. opposite), led to basically the same effects as were reported for the low-aware participants. Again we found This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
evidence for capture, indicated by a significant main effect of cue position, F(1, 9) ϭ 55.4, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .86, with faster responses in SP (RT ϭ 395 ms) than DP conditions (RT ϭ 415 ms). All other effects failed to reach significance (both ps Ͼ .12).
Awareness of cues and its correlation with orienting. We found no correlation between orienting or cueing effects in the short SOA and the respective cue-awareness indices (percentage values) for either contrast polarity (same polarity: p ϭ .78, statistical power of the correlation 1Ϫ␤ ϭ .79; opposite polarity: p ϭ .20, 1Ϫ␤ ϭ .52).
Discussion
In Experiment 3, we were able to replicate the findings from the first two experiments, even though participants actively ignored the opposite target-contrast polarity. Again, a capture effect was found for both high-and low-aware participants. This finding indicates that unconscious abrupt-onset cues not only reliably triggered attention shifts, but that these orienting effects are also resistant to avoidance (Jonides, 1981) . This further supported the conclusion that the orienting toward these contrast stimuli is indeed purely exogenous.
Experiment 4
In Experiment 4 we tested whether participants can set up a search set for contrast polarity at all. Furthermore, we aimed to demonstrate a qualitative difference between the processing of subliminal and supraliminal cues. The reason for this is simple. In the preceding experiments, our conclusions were based on a relatively weak criterion of subliminality-that is, post hoc grouping depending on discrimination performance during cue localization. Here, we wanted to address this issue and replace post hoc grouping with the manipulation of an independent variable-that is, whether the cues were presented subliminally or supraliminally. For our tests, cues were either presented subliminally or supraliminally in two separate blocks 16 ms prior to the target. Also, as in Experiment 1, each participant searched for only one particular target polarity: either white targets or black targets. As a consequence, participants were able to set up top-down search sets for just one of the contrast polarities. If participants can set up a top-down set for contrast polarity at all, at least with visible cues, we expected contingent capture, indicated by a cueing effect for cues of the same polarity as the target and a lack of this effect for cues of the opposite polarity. As in the prior experiments, we expected exogenous capture for the invisible cues, reflected by a significant cueing effect independent of the top-down set-that is, regardless of a match of the contrast polarity between cue and searched-for target contrast.
Method
Participants. Twenty new participants (11 women; mean age 22.5 years, range 19 -33) took part in Experiment 4. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli and procedure. The experimental setup of one block in Experiment 4 was exactly the same as the short SOA condition in Experiment 1. (Long SOAs were not included.) This was the subliminal condition. In addition, we also presented supraliminal cues in a separate block. Here, cues were rendered visible by omitting the two additional placeholder rings. Under these conditions, it is easy to see the cue. It is the only ring in the display. Again, cues equally likely preceded the target at the same or different position, and had the same or the opposite contrast polarity. Within every block, different conditions were presented in a random sequence. The sequence of the subliminal and supraliminal blocks was balanced across participants.
Results
Awareness of subliminal cues. We calculated correctly located cues as a percentage value for the subliminal and supraliminal condition separately. Participants detected the cues significantly above chance level in both conditions (both ps Ͻ .001 against 50%), with significantly higher accuracy in the supraliminal (mean percent correct ϭ 95.9%) than in the subliminal condition (mean percent correct ϭ 70.4%, p Ͻ .001).
Unconscious cueing task. Participants generally performed well on this task, reflected in only a small number of misses and false alarms (mean error rate for supraliminal cues: 0.9% in targetpresent and 8.5% in the catch trials; mean error rate for subliminal cues: 0.9% in target-present trials and 12.3% in the catch trials). For the RT analysis, the trials with incorrect responses and the RT outliers (4.2%) were excluded. Results are depicted in Figure 5 .
A repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean correct RTs with the variables cue position (SP vs. DP), contrast polarity (same vs. opposite), and cue presentation (subliminal vs. supraliminal) led to the following results. We found a significant interaction between cue position and cue presentation, F(1, 19) ϭ 32.7, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .63, and between cue position and contrast polarity, F(1, 19) ϭ 7.9, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .29. Post hoc Bonferroni-adjusted t tests confirmed significant cueing effects in the subliminal condition for both same-(SP: RT ϭ 327 ms, DP: RT ϭ 357 ms; p Ͻ .001) and opposite-polarity cues (SP: RT ϭ 330 ms, DP: RT ϭ 355 ms; p Ͻ .001). It is crucial to note, a significant cueing effect was only found for supraliminal same-polarity cues (SP: RT ϭ 328 ms, DP: RT ϭ 337 ms; p Ͻ .05), whereas a nonsignificant inhibition was found for the supraliminal opposite-contrast cues (SP: RT ϭ 336 ms, DP: RT ϭ 331 ms; p ϭ .23). Furthermore, we found a significant main effect for cue position, F(1, 19) ϭ 40.1, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .68, reflecting generally faster responses in the SP (RT ϭ 330 ms) than in the DP condition (RT ϭ 345 ms).
Discussion
In Experiment 4, we tested whether participants can set up a search set for contrast polarity. In line with this assumption, in the supraliminal cueing condition, we found attentional capture only for contrast-polarity matching cues, but not by cues of the opposite polarity as the searched-for target. These results indicate top-down contingent capture for contrast polarity in the case that supraliminal, clearly visible cues were used. Subliminal cues again captured attention independently of their contrast polarity, indicating exogenous orienting toward subliminal cues. These findings also provide evidence that the subliminal cues used in Experiments 1 to 3 indeed remained outside the participants' awareness: If the participants would have been aware of the cues in the preceding experiments, top-down contingent capture should have also been This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
found in these experiments. Unexpectedly, the cueing effect of the same-polarity supraliminal cues was relatively small compared with the subliminal condition (see also Figure 5b ). A possible explanation is that participants tried to actively ignore the visible cues because they were aware of these cues, and the cues did not provide any information about the upcoming target position. Using this perspective, top-down contingent capture would present the most difficulty in avoiding residual capture effect. By contrast, a larger cueing effect in the subliminal conditions might have reflected that with a lower awareness about the cues, the participants probably also failed to register that the cue captured attention at all. As a consequence, participants would not have actively avoided their exogenous orienting toward the subliminal cues, and hence, exogenous capture exceeded contingent capture. Note that the results of Experiment 4 could also be interpreted as a quantitative difference, given that the effects are smaller for those participants who were least aware of the cues compared with those who were highly aware.
General Discussion
Previous research has suggested that abrupt-onset cues outside awareness may capture attention in a purely exogenous fashion (McCormick, 1997; Mulckhuyse & Theeuwes, 2010) . The aim of the current work was to clarify whether top-down contingent capture could equally account for these findings . To be precise, we tested one crucial prediction of the exogenous capture explanation. If the exogenous capture explanation is correct, the polarity of the unconscious cue's contrast should be immaterial for the orienting effect of the cue. As long as the strength of a contrast is the same, the cueing effect of dark and light cues should be the same, too (Steinman et al., 1997) . This prediction follows from the definition of salience, as relying on a calculated feature difference between the cue and the background (Itti et al., 1998) .
In all of our experiments, we found that the results were in line with this prediction of the exogenous-capture account (Mulckhuyse et al., 2007) . We observed facilitation of target search for SP relative to DP conditions in the short cue-target intervals. It is important to note, this orienting effect was independent of whether the subliminal cues' contrast polarities matched the set of searched-for target-contrast polarities. Furthermore, these results were also found for those participants who were least aware of the cues, confirming the notion that these orienting effects may occur in a condition of unconscious vision. In fact, all of our participants subjectively claimed to not have seen the cues. Therefore we can be relatively sure that the cues were presented at least below the subjective threshold of awareness for all participants (Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001) . The finding that clearly visible cues captured attention in a top-down contingent way (supraliminal condition of Experiment 4) further strengthens the conclusion that participants remained unaware of the subliminal cues. However, future studies should also address alternative manipulations of cue awareness. For instance, omitting the two additional placeholder rings to render the cue visible as was done Experiment 4 could be critical. Instead, using a unique color for the cue (e.g., red) among differently colored distractor rings (e.g., luminance-matched green rings, when searching for a black target) could equally make the cue clearly visible.
Of interesting, and in line with an awareness-independent cueing effect, we also did not observe reliable correlations between any of our participants' performances in the cue-detection blocks and the average orienting or cueing effects. If the orienting effect This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
would have depended on the participants' awareness of the cue, we should have found stronger orienting for those participants who were able to see the cues-that is, a correlation between the performance in the cue-report task and the orienting effect. Since there was no reliable correlation, we conclude that the abrupt-onset cues captured attention in an awareness-independent way. Together, these results are fully commensurate with an explanation of unconscious automatic orienting that is exogenously triggered.
Top-Down Contingent Capture Versus Exogenous Capture
The present results are different from Ansorge et al. (2010) and Held et al. (2010) . These authors found that unconscious orienting was contingent on top-down control settings for color. In the present study, in which we used contrast polarity, however, unconscious orienting was independent of the top-down control settings. We have to assume that the mechanisms involved in color cueing are different than those involved when cueing with contrast polarity. It is possible that the visual pathways that are responsible for unconscious color cueing are different than the pathways that bring about truly automatic unconscious orienting because the latter pathways could be color-blind. According to Mulckhuyse and Theeuwes (2010) , the magnocellular projection of the visual system in general and the superior colliculi in particular are responsible for exogenous unconscious orienting. Processing via the magnocellular pathway and the superior colliculi could be bypassed if participants have to search for color to find the targets, because the superficial layers of the superior colliculi are color blind (White, Boehnke, Marino, Itti, & Munoz, 2009 ). Therefore, if participants have to search for color targets, any residual type of unconscious orienting would depend on processing along the parvocellular pathway of the visual system. In line with this possibility, some types of unconscious vision, such as the discrimination of fine spatial detail during shape processing, seem to depend on processing along the parvocellular pathway (e.g., Tapia & Breitmeyer, 2011) . In other words, the participants' search for colordefined targets (e.g., Ansorge et al., 2010; Held et al., 2010; Scharlau & Ansorge, 2003) or for targets of fine spatial detail (e.g., Woodman & Luck, 2003) could have necessitated the use of the color-sensitive parvocellular pathway, which also allows discriminating fine spatial detail. This in turn would have been responsible for the top-down contingency of unconscious color cueing (e.g., Ansorge et al., 2010) and successful top-down search for unconscious shape targets (e.g., Woodman & Luck, 2003) .
It should be noted that in none of our experiments did we find any evidence for IOR at the long cue-target intervals. This result is inconsistent with Mulckhuyse et al. (2007) . If one adheres to the position that IOR is a hallmark of exogenous capture (Theeuwes & Godijn, 2002; Mulckhuyse & Theeuwes, 2010) , which is typically not observed following endogenous attention shifts (Pratt, Kingstone, & Khoe, 1997) unless participants prepare to move their eyes (Rafal, Calabresi, Brennan, & Sciolto, 1989) , then the absence of IOR may limit the present conclusions. In preceding experiments, different hypotheses for the lack of IOR were testedwith the use of higher cue contrasts (Hunt & Kingstone, 2003) and various SOAs (for more details see Fuchs & Ansorge, 2012) . None of these manipulations, including an exact replication of the procedures of Mulckhuyse et al. (2007) , proved sufficient to elicit IOR under the present conditions (Fuchs & Ansorge, 2012) .
Conclusion
In conclusion, our data are fully in line with an important prediction of the exogenous-capture explanation of unconscious orienting to subliminal abrupt-onset singleton cues. This finding is consistent with prior results emphasizing the special role of stimulus-driven capture for sudden onsets (Yantis & Jonides, 1984; Theeuwes, 2010) , and with traditional concepts of automatic processing (Posner & Snyder, 1975 This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Appendix B Additional Results of Experiment 2
(Appendices continue) Note. Post hoc Bonferroni-adjusted t-tests for further investigation of the significant interaction between cue position and contrast polarity revealed nonsignificant IOR effects for both same-(p ϭ .33) and opposite-polarity cues (p ϭ .72). The found interaction can be explained by a nearly significant difference between same-and opposite-polarity cues at the same position (SP) as the target (p ϭ .06) and a nonsignificant difference at the different position (DP; p ϭ .56). * p Ͻ .05. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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